

Cosmopolitan Patriotism

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ABSTRACT: *What is the value of patriotism in a globalized world? As the global increasingly penetrates the local and vice versa, our education and socialization strategies need to prepare future generations to think on multiple levels. This facility is especially necessary if the competing interests and institutions that work in and across states are to be made substantively accountable. This essay places into conversation cosmopolitanism and patriotism and argues that not only can cosmopolitans be patriotic, but also that patriotism must be reconceived with a cosmopolitan spirit. The essay also argues that the state must be the focus of political action, and that focus must be multifaceted, being cognizant of the state as a transnational process that operates on multiple levels and directions in particular contexts but also in the world beyond. Patriotism therefore must take the form of a love for something that is acknowledged to be not static, constantly moving and reforming. Cosmopolitanism is important for conceiving attachments to such a mercurial thing because it is itself a dynamic form of solidarity.*

With the re-emergence in political theory of cosmopolitanism as an alternative catalyst for progressive politics, there tended to be an apologetic tone that accompanied its endorsement. Theories of cosmopolitanism are often expressed tentatively or defensively in contrast to nationalism or patriotism as if the latter are givens (Mehta, 2000; Waldron, 2000; Köhler, 1997; Meinecke, 1970). And when conceived in morally legitimate terms, nationalism and patriotism appear inherently beneficial in ways, it is argued, the upstart cosmopolitanism could never hope to be (Hill, 2000; Himmelfarb, 1996; Mansfield, 1994). This essay places into conversation the purportedly contradictory grounds for solidarity in cosmopolitanism and patriotism to argue that not only can cosmopolitans be patriotic, but that today patriotism must be conceived with a cosmopolitan ethos. This imperative certainly obtains for progressive politics, but in our global context, conservatism must also take heed.

Historically much abused, cosmopolitanism's resurgence has in part been the result of an increasingly interdependent world and the exasperation with neoliberal and socialist internationalisms by those seeking to articulate social justice imperatives in a globalizing context. To be sure, the ideal is both old and a newcomer to the scene, and it has always faced the question—in Aristotle's terms—that if the definition of a human as such is a being belonging to a specific polis of some kind, what kind of creature belongs to a cosmic polis or a general polis of all rational beings? What is reason or *logos* for such creatures? Thus, in Anderson's (1991) more recent formulation, if a nation is a kind of polis or community that

perceives itself as sharing a common fate—a particular shared history and set of tangible historical practices—then what is it to belong to a polis that does not necessarily share these concrete characteristics? Indeed, the cosmopolis is conceived as timeless and placeless.¹ However, membership in the cosmopolis today is determined by those faculties that allow humans to seek justice and to live simultaneously in individual and species being in the face of dehumanizing global capitalist and fundamentalist religious forces (Commissiong, 2011). Over the last century, a potential concrete community seems to be emerging on a global scale in ways that Aristotle could not foresee or possibly comprehend (Beck, 2006; Held, 1995). As a consequence of technological innovations in communication and travel, that potential, global community can be entered into by mere assent and attitude or practice without having to change location.

In part, these distinctions mark the ancient world off from the modern, but they also begin to underscore the differences between what cosmopolitan conceptions of community and patriotic or nationalistic versions offer. These conceptions and practices of community share an associative character that mark them all as forms of human togetherness. As such, this essay teases out the related strands to demonstrate a stronger, more just patriotism, and how the concrete allegiances the cosmopolitan ethos demands can shape it. The challenge here is in part to show the potential of the community of cosmopolitan belonging and how it positively affects patriotism's particular strengths and weaknesses. Conversely, patriotism may have something to say to the cosmopolitan association as well.

Two concerns must be addressed from the outset. First, cosmopolitanism does not seek to destroy the positive aspects of local, particular bonds that patriotism can possess.² From its beginning, cosmopolitanism acknowledged that we do belong to a local, physical polis of some kind (Schofield, 1991). Even so, it always insisted that we belong to a cosmo-polis as well. Second, our increasingly interdependent global age has developed shared practices and experiences, albeit mediated through forms of corporate-controlled connections or made possible through not-always affordable rapid travel. I highlight the economic aspects of these media primarily to underscore the limitations on their availability, and because the media affect the message.³ That is, while many of these communicative media and transit routes are increasingly ubiquitous, they still do not extend to everyone. Moreover, they are subject to state and corporate interventions and limitations. As such, there is much ground to cover if, as is the purpose of this essay, one means to show how cosmopolitanism can be patriotic. In order to avoid the craven currents that often permeate discussions of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, the intent is to make patriotism more cosmopolitan.

The following first puts into context past and present political arenas to diagnose the special challenges faced by contemporary political communities. Then, I turn to the question of sovereignty and its shortcomings. The final section fleshes out solutions to these new challenges to political solidarity in a global context that cosmopolitanism can help us comprehend.

Politics ancient and modern (community right and individual right)

Our contemporary world has been shaped as much by recent technological and economic innovations as it has by its inheritances from the past. Chief among these developments is the indisputably interconnected nature of our existence today. Although nation states may have more recent origins, nations are longstanding collectivities of fiction and fact (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1991). They are shaped by realities and imaginaries of humans being together. When cosmopolitanism was first articulated in the ancient Greek city at its high point, the city was a small, intimate community of men. And while not all interests were the same—often resulting in violent clashes between individuals and groups (Morris, 1996)—that society was far more homogenous than today's national and globally transnational communities. Aristotle (1995)

argued that human beings as such could only exist in a polis of some kind, for it was the only means by which political beings and community could develop toward their fullest, most complex forms. The polis embodies the shared experiences and history that shape the moral and political horizon of action and affection that determine the constellation of expectations and limitations against which individuals could excel before their fellows and thus strive for immortality in communal memory. Even the iconoclast Socrates, in choosing to take his life rather than leave his city, understood that his existence as a human being was shaped by and dependent upon his relations to his fellow citizens through the process of enacting laws together.

Against this context, the Stoics posed the challenge of a community beyond the physical and conceptual walls of the city. Admittedly, many early Stoics held views either effectively similar to the elitist version of community Aristotle conceived, or, at best, accommodating unequal institutions that existed then, such as slavery and the exclusion of women (Nussbaum, 1994). Thus while Aristotle believed in the rule of the best, some Stoics believed in an exclusive community of rational beings. This formulation was only slightly more compatible with the modern cosmopolitan ethos because these later Hellenistic cosmopolitans, unlike their fellow Greeks generally, understood this potential community of rational beings to be universal and inclusive of women, foreigners, and slaves. Additionally, the way the Roman Stoics later took up these ideas in, for example, Marcus Aurelius' sincere cosmopolitanism, it could scarcely have been of comfort to those he conquered. I raise these issues not to condemn early cosmopolitanisms per se, but rather to highlight how much the ideal has changed, for the germ of the idea they shared evolved into something more.

These changes occurred over several centuries. Greek cosmopolitanism fed into, altered, and was altered by ideas from Rome and Western monotheisms to become a set of natural law ideals concerning universal interaction and human rights (d'Entrèves, 1996; Ishay, 2004). As Pauline Kleingeld (1999) shows, by the eighteenth century in Germany, the ideal had crystallized in the modern context into at least six different varieties: economic, political, moral, cultural, romantic, legal and international cosmopolitanisms. Through the tumultuous period of Western democratization and nation-state formation culminating in the horrors of the twentieth century's wars and genocides, cosmopolitanism in response coalesced further around three groupings: the moral-political-legal variety, the cultural-romantic variety, and the economic-

international-cultural variety (Commissiong, 2011). What can be identified in each of these as authentically “cosmopolitan” will not be elaborated here, as the distinctions are largely, but not entirely, unimportant for this essay. Rather, the purpose of this brief account is to illustrate that, like other ideals inherited from the past such as patriotism, cosmopolitanism has also changed over time, reflecting particular conditions and challenges while retaining core sets of principles.

Stoics and their cosmopolitan descendants claimed a noumenal connection through logos to other human beings outside the bounded community, but this intangible claim was easily ignored. The phenomenological consequences of our interconnections today, however, have become harder to ignore. Thus, Beck (2006) correctly points out that the “important fact now is that the human condition has itself become cosmopolitan” (p. 1). Only the most militant nationalists today conceive the nation as a static, homogenous community of strictly exclusive, shared existence. Alternatively, while conceiving the nation state as a contractual agreement amongst heterogeneous interests in which the state and its institutions merely play arbitrating roles in achieving justice was present even at the nation state’s formation (Meinecke, 1970; Mill, 1978), only in the last half century have the full implications of this liberal idea come to dominate national discourse, at least in the West. The emergence of robust anti-imperialist, multiculturalist, and pluralist demands located in new social movements, as well as postcolonial struggles, posed new challenges to the shaping of national identity and policy since the middle of the twentieth century. These challenges foregrounded the relation of state to citizens and the unmet demands for popular sovereignty in ever more radical ways. The emergence and legitimacy of these actors’ demands can be said to be the product of what Habermas (1987) has called the ongoing philosophical discourse of modernity—a dialectical unfolding of reason and freedom through material and discursive civil contestation. Alternatively, Honig (2006) and others suggest the battle for human dignity is less the cunning of reason in history as the agility of power and unreason. In practical terms, the broadening demands of recognition and redistribution have in some contexts become more legitimate, even if they are being denied in advanced industrialized, post-industrial, and developing societies alike by a growing chorus of far Right conceptions of corporate and theocratic states.

Another consequence of this broadening of demands is that nationalism and patriotism have been acknowledged by most to be more complex constellations

of the means by which members of modern states interact with and relate to each other and the state. The substantively different economic and social conceptions of the role of the state in arbitrating the resultant conflicts, or, the state’s role in fulfilling its side of the bargain as the monopolizer of the legitimate use of force, has become ever more significant through the role of law (Habermas, 1999; Sandel, 1996). Disagreements over the role of the state resulting from increasing ranges and types of demands have played out in populist and elite movements alike through the legal system. In the last decade in the United States, for example, the rise of the Tea Party represents on the Right an amalgam of populist organizations fueled in part by corporate interests. The far more recent eruptions of Left-wing protests seem in many regards an attempt to present an alternate vision of the responsibilities of government. To be sure, divergent interests like these had always been tied up in the conception and functioning of the state.

The nation state was and is a contest over projected fictions and realities of certain groups who sought to monopolize its institutions (Anderson, 1991). These particular visions of the state sought to simplify the complexity of the community (Scott, 1998; Tilly, 1992) in the image of the hegemon.⁴ This mode of politics today no longer claims complete monopoly on most understandings of the legitimate purpose and makeup of the state even though stalwarts maintain this fiction. The foregrounding of longstanding controversies over immigration; the introduction and now retrenchment of social welfare programs; the responsibility of the state to defend underpowered minorities, women, and the underclass; as well as many other areas all manifest not only the competition for resources and peril in which national and transnational economies place us and themselves, but these conflicts are also intimately caught up in the self-conception of individuals and their political solidarity in and to the state (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). For while neither the Tea Party nor Occupy groups explicitly articulate it, they each have competing understandings not only of the role of the state, which is the most obvious public dispute, but they also possess different visions of the individual’s constitution and her relation to her fellows through the state. Beyond the state, as the politics of human rights itself constrain in whatever limited way how European and North American countries exercise power domestically and in the world beyond, the recognition of and respect for other forms of life for the first time have become at least nominally more important in the machinations of world powers. These new levels of recognition

compound the difficulty in achieving world consensus as divergent agendas, interests, and belief systems enter the fray. For example, it would be stretching this portrait only slightly to argue that despite the variety of languages, cultures, and political forms inside Western Europe, it is the fear for their own security in the face of this great domestic and global diversity, this teeming horde as it were, that drives European states toward stricter protective association. That is to say, any international association Western and other powerful states create may be as much strategic as it is moral-legal. The test of European coordination and cooperation is the challenge that if it is indeed the case that the form of international association that has been developing there and that is again in crisis is predominantly instrumental or worse, reactionary, whether normative voices can be raised in order to affect the just development of current and future institutions. One hopes that since democratic nation-states are in whatever small part contained by legally institutionalized moral imperatives, any intensifying international European association based in law cannot help but incorporate some normative perspective. The need is to make this moral-legal institutionalization more important than the economic or potentially xenophobic ones as sources of solidarity to people these states supposedly represent.

I have been speaking mostly in general terms because these economic and sociocultural crises have shaken all nation-states and all regions, not just the wealthy ones on one side, or the poor or developing ones on the other. To be sure, these crises have played out in different ways in different contexts: from the revolts in predominantly Muslim countries that have toppled governments to the continued uprisings in the West (Kulich, 2011).⁵ Moreover, under the corrosive effects of global recession, less economically developed states have borne the brunt of these challenges. Yet these revolts have not only been on the Left. Indeed, the Tea Party movement in the United States and religious and nationalist fundamentalists there and elsewhere are certainly harbingers of more conservative and Right-libertarian tendencies and intolerant orthodoxies that increasingly seek a legitimating voice in domestic and international public spheres.⁶ In short, both ends of the political spectrum are discontent with current conditions. Significantly, these internal and external challenges are focused on and through the nation state and place pressures on it to a degree it has not seen before precisely because of the expanded conceptual and spatial challenges they represent to the state. Again, it should be noted that these challenges had to lesser degrees always been part of this relatively new entity called

the nation-state. But now, what is at stake is arguably greater than ever before. From environmental catastrophes that are byproducts of industrial production affecting multiple states, to the economic interdependence that variously wreaks havoc and builds up societies, to the increased mobility of human bodies and interests that bring us together and increase the legal and illicit trade in commodities and people, the consequences of missteps due to limited vision have increased exponentially. All of those shared challenges underscore Beck's (2006) observation concerning the inescapably global character of the human condition today. Therefore, in many ways each challenge in our contemporary world has increasing effects much farther beyond the boundaries of a particular state or even region.

Given the challenges of this global interdependence, a number of solutions present themselves. There is of course the withdrawal from global international community. This strategy insists on maintaining territorial and ideational integrity by cleaving ever closer to a limited conception of national sovereignty. This course is more of an option for some states than for others and thus can be implemented more or less successfully by some states than by others. The constant calls in the United States to abandon or abolish the United Nations, the Bush administration's claim to a right to strike first in the so-called war on terror, the current administration's continuation of drone warfare, the slow pace of efforts to salvage the Greek economy by its European partners (and the unnecessarily painful and unproductive economic austerity imposed), all demonstrate only the beginning of a rising acceptance of unilateralism, isolationism and austerity. The alternate vision is one of multilateralism and engagement through the loose array of world political and economic governance structures. This strategy has been variously deployed by world powers with varying degrees of contentiousness and success. For despite the United Nation's clear shortcomings, for example, it is far more consistent with cosmopolitan principles than what came before. On the other hand, the recent austerity measures imposed on European countries, in echoes of past IMF and WTO policies in the developing world, have proven more damaging than helpful (Blyth, 2013; Wolf, 2013).

An alternate tradition of interaction and intercourse developed concurrently with these problematic conceptions and practices of the modern state. Immanuel Kant (1795/1991) famously insisted that international peace could only exist between associations of states with open, republican forms of government. In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant provides three reasons why peace is likely among confed-

erated republican states. These are the relative aversion republican citizens have for war; the pacifying effects of commerce; and the role the public sphere can play in limiting aggression. Not all of these reasons have stood up well to scrutiny over time (Habermas, 1997). Yet the core of his cosmopolitan observation is more pertinent today than ever. Contrary to Kant's expectations, one major weakness of multilateral strategies is those domestic publics who fear the loss of sovereignty, wealth, and the dilution of power. These fears are actually exacerbated by the isolationist approach in the face of a perilous, globally interconnected economy and environment. Moreover, if the multilateral approach does not evolve to incorporate a more substantively cosmopolitan strategy that confronts these ideational and material conditions by strengthening and supporting the democratic component of domestic and international structures already in place, the effectiveness and accountability of these structures will be further diminished. In democratic or republican states, any sustained support and accountability can only truly come from the bottom up. Increasingly when governments try to lead in support of internationalization and economic austerity programs, they are repudiated because the trust of publics has been continuously betrayed (Held & McGrew, 2002a). This is in effect a Catch-22. Domestic publics do not trust global governance structures because they feel no allegiance to them because global institutions have too often failed them. And when global governance structures fail, it is often because governments, seeking to curry favor with corporate interests, financial markets, and even those very publics, do not adequately support them (Held & McGrew, 2002a). To be sure, corporate and financial imperatives became the lingua franca because of the lack of anything approaching consensus on even the basic terms of discourse in the public sphere initially domestically and now internationally as the modern world emerged conceptually from under the sacred canopy of hegemonic religious foundationalism (Hirschman, 1977). The resultant vision of an economic individual or a human driven primarily by self-regarding, cost-benefit economic concerns that grew out of these developments, supplanted the political and social conceptions of the individual from antiquity (Commissioning, 2011; Habermas, 1989). This in turn altered the view of citizens and their relation to each other, to the state, and to the world beyond. Therefore, the understanding of citizenship and patriotic allegiance must be re-imagined in expansive ways in order to meet these transnational economic, environmental, security, and other challenges as well as the broadened framework of politics today. The ex-

panded view of citizenship does not weaken but strengthens the authorizing voice of concretely located local publics because it does not seek to return patriotism and citizenship to an erstwhile context, but rather attempts to address the current globality with the strengths of the two. This means state sovereignty is still important and must be fortified and concurrently made more accountable in broader ways because the state is the principle means of transmitting and amplifying the interests of those publics. In this regard it cannot be stated strongly enough the paramount importance of noting the direction the state has taken in the last 60 years or so has opened it to the charge of dereliction at worst and misjudgment at best in its responsibilities toward its people in favor of global capitalist and corporate interests (Commissioning, 2011; Harvey, 2005). However, this means citizenship and patriotism must also be reconceived and strengthened against corporatization of both in order that the humanist interests of the people and the civic state may be more fully realized. This can only come from a cosmopolitan patriotism. The reconception of citizenship in this transnational way allows people to negotiate better the tensions between global and local belongings and responsibilities.

Sovereignty Re-imagined, Citizenship Expanded

Certainly tensions exist between cosmopolitanism and patriotism, but these tensions do not render them incompatible. As Kok-Chor Tan (2010) suggests, "a cosmopolitan theory that cannot accommodate certain forms of associative ties that characterize the lives of individuals, including the ties of nationality, is *prima facie* implausible" (p. 177). These tensions ultimately can prove productive if each side engages the other constructively. Indeed, the critical aspect of modern cosmopolitan conceptions of the human and politics is the dynamic character of the subject that is able to engage its political and social connections in terms of principle as well as interest (Commissioning, 2011). The Stoic cosmopolitan ideal insisted, in the terms of Hierocles's well-known metaphor, that we exist in concentric circles of allegiance that must be drawn in closer to the center. The circles of allegiance of individuals in a community always overlapped, and now such interrelations undeniably extend to fellow inhabitants of our planet. The implication of this metaphor is that even though a cosmopolitan patriotism insists identity and allegiance are dynamic and mutable, it accepts that they are also not meaningless. The individual at the center of those

circles has real, sometimes unconscious investments in them, for the individual is the anchor that holds together a variety of experiences and commitments to particular interpretations of the world and her connections to them. But while those relations can often be unconscious or taken as a given, the individual is also able to be conscious of those connections and judge them according to moral conception of beings in similar conditions. While the realization of similar conditions may not be related directly to similar experiences, the point here is that other individuals live with their own set of circles of allegiance. In a community of shared fate, one of those outer circles of belonging is certainly the state. Thus members of a political community share at least one circle of allegiance in the state, even if they may disagree about its contours.

As the preceding section suggested, the challenges to the nation state today require thinking about national identity and patriotism to be inflected with more planetary perspectives. To begin, we should remind ourselves that if the ideal cosmopolitan community can be criticized because it is entered into by mere assent, it must also be acknowledged that the particular national community is entered into by accident of birth. Thus the advantage of associational integrity the material state has over the cosmopolitan community diminishes on the grounds of the moral arbitrariness and contingency of that particular association. Even so, most modern cosmopolitan formulations accept, at least in principle, the significance and integrity of the concrete association. There has been some give on the other side as well. For example, in states that operate predominantly under the principle of *jus sanguinis*, naturalization barriers have certainly become less restrictive. Still, for those who are unable to travel and change their unfavorable location, cosmopolitanism insists we ask why the “birthright lottery” condemns some to poverty, limited possibilities, and death because of the accident of where we are born. This question extends the already highly contentious domestic demands for redistribution and recognition beyond the state. In truth, these demands have always been present, albeit in much more muted ways or with far less concrete possibilities of realization. What responsibilities the state and its members have to each other are set in stark relief against the larger questions of responsibilities of states and human beings to other human beings outside the political body. What then motivates action in each of these domains?

Broadly speaking, there are two communal determinants of action: the legal-institutional and the affective. An additional, extra-communal determinant are meta-physical rules, which indicates right action in the abstract,

but has no concrete effect until it is realized through the legal-institutional order motivates action in less tangible ways. The legal-institutional determinant of action is empirical in the sense that institutions, acting on at most nominal legal grounds, can and do physically enforce their will. The affective determinants are less empirical, even though they are arguably more effective since affective determinants can influence and have access to individuals on a personal, subjective level—in communities, in families, and in the subject’s interior being—in ways that the legal-institutional influencers might not. Part of the resistance to globalization that connects the two poles of the political spectrum is the justified suspicion that economic globalization undermines both legal-institutional and affective determinants and thus the will of the people by loosening the affective bonds that reinforce the process of will formation and expression that render legitimacy to the state. Sovereignty in the modern era was tied up in democratic right and will formation. If the People is theoretically sovereign, as claimed in most struggles of modern state formation and foundation, that means the destabilizing of sovereignty that economic globalization produces destabilizes both democratic will itself and its ability to affect or authorize the state’s actions. Additionally, if we might appropriate and democratize the French king’s formula and maintain that the State is the People, globalization’s effect on sovereignty destabilizes the integrity of the patriotic bands of the People as well. Of course, in practical terms, the sovereignty that globalization destabilizes is first and foremost the sovereignty of the governing apparatus, since in modern states, it is governments that represent and actualize through mediated processes the People’s will. Therefore, the absolutely well placed suspicion of globalization and its ancillary transnational processes taints cosmopolitanism as well because there has been a poor job done in distinguishing cosmopolitanism from globalization. This effect makes nationalists out of conservatives and progressives in the debate over the role of the state. That nationalism is certainly expressed in various ways, but it is fundamentally isolationist in its result. It makes little difference if on the one hand the demand is for work for our workers, or the withdrawal from international forums, the effect is still the same: a pulling back from the global arena of exchange.

The neoliberal international order, in which private property, capital flows, and sometimes forced movements of peoples, is driven by a consumptive worldview. It is consumptive in the sense that it is driven forward by capital accumulation fed by production and consumption. It is also consumptive in the sense that it overrides

all local practices, worldviews, and histories that it cannot make compatible or profitable with itself. It is for this reason that it is essentially misleading to call globalization Westernization. For even in the West, forms of life that are incompatible with modernization and globalization have been wiped out or are in mortal combat with them (Sassen, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; Weber, 1976). Indeed, it makes more sense to conflate modernization and globalization, because both have at their core a highly materialist image of the world. It is true that in Western Europe, the clash between empiricism and idealism reached several tentative stalemates (between Mill and Marx, and between capitalism and socialism, for example). But in truth, as a function of the Anglophone dominance of world arenas, the materialist strain in liberalism pioneered by Locke and carried forward by Mill now dominates.

It has long been time when we must rethink the principles that underlie global expansion in light of what we know of its many negative and positive effects (Held & McGrew, 2002b; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002). Ulrich Beck (1998) has argued that, “[a]ny attempt to create a new sense of social cohesion has to start from the recognition that individualisation, diversity and scepticism are written into our culture.” Beck suggests that our radical, institutional individualism means that we are freed from the bonds and baggage of community. Even so, we must admit

living alone means living socially. . . . How can a secular society exposed to the rigours of the global market, based on an institutionalised individualism, in the midst of a global communications explosion, also foster a sense of belonging, trust and cohesion? Only through political freedom: a source of cohesion, one which is not exhausted by daily use but only flows stronger. (Beck, 1998, p. 28)

What this freedom produces in us is a feeling that values are being lost. But in fact what is occurring is not really the loss of values, but the transvaluation of the old set of values into the new “in which the hierarchical certainty of ontological differences is displaced by the creative uncertainty of freedom” (Beck, 1998, pp. 28–29). But almost immediately Beck asks, while all this freedom is impressive, what are the “side effects” of globalization?

One such side effect is a new kind of imperialism in which weak states are subordinated to institutions of “global governance.” Another is the double standard of global morality. In the age of globalization, there is no easy escape from this democratic dilemma. The central problem is that without a politically strong cosmopolitan

consciousness and corresponding institutions of global civil society and public opinion, cosmopolitan democracy remains, for all the institutional ideals, no more than a regulative utopia. The decisive question is whether and how a consciousness of specifically cosmopolitan—as opposed to a general—global solidarity can develop. Acknowledging interconnectedness is part of perceiving the world in global terms, and as I have been arguing, this is becoming harder and harder to deny. But the question of what do to about that interconnectedness is the purview of a cosmopolitan sensibility and politics.

According to Beck, what we are left with is a situation in which the dominant corporatism already seeks to fulfill its interests on a global scale, while the citizen still identifies herself in ways proscribed by the state. This is so despite the fact that those forces that affect the life of the citizen are both local and global in origin and scope. Clive Thomas (2000) notes that globalization is a process driven by the glib assurances and confidence in market forces and actors. Taking this observation into account, this I turn next to the cosmopolitan ideal’s demands for global, mutually beneficial outcomes and institutions. In addition, the solution to the confrontation between negative universalism and negative fundamentalism is not necessarily more democracy alone, rather, it should be action determined by a cosmopolitan democracy. Democratic nationalism only reinforces the same tribalism with bigger players by setting a field of interaction with unequal players.

Practicing Political Solidarities in a Modern, Globalized World

Humans live in various ways across the globe. Generally speaking, the variety may be conceived in terms of a range from those that emphasize the individual more to others that place primacy in the community. The various kinds of states are not always commensurable and often conflict based in these emphases. Even within the same political, social, economic, cultural or even familial context, different positions often emerge. Most intriguing of all is the conflicting drives within the smallest unit of political analysis: the individual. The world of human affairs stretches from this microscopic point of personal competing imperatives and desires to the macroscopic plain of interstate dealings. Any conception of human political practice rooted in respect for this human variety cannot seek to overcome it. Rather, the question before us centers on what ways we can find to live in peace and prosperity in

light of it. This is the question that any substantive cosmopolitanism must attempt to illuminate, if not answer.

Cosmopolitanism insists that we owe our fellow human beings some moral and, therefore, practical duties no matter where they live. In terms of analysis, these duties can be described in theoretical and practical terms. Since duties that are moral-theoretical do not appear in the world empirically unless they are realized through actions or institutions, they must somehow be translated into material effects if we intend for our moral determinations or feelings of solidarity to have concrete consequence. This means that our actions in the world have to be focused on actual material conditions; these material conditions may run the gamut from the embodied existence of people and our direct interactions with each other to the political and public sphere institutions in and through which we live our lives together. Thus our concerns and the empirical structures through which we act in our attempt to realize ideals, have to be the most proximate institutions through which we may realize our moral concerns or solidarity. This is none other than the state⁷ in which we find ourselves. As Kant maintained, the republican nation-state form is the best model so far imagined to accommodate the dignity of human freedom and the need for coordination of those free individuals. Although it is also true of other forms of the state, the republican state is the most proximate and powerful political institution through which we may be able to act in the world. A state is not necessarily the most powerful entity in the world at any given moment, but it is certainly in its republican form the most powerful entity over which a populace has any semblance of control, at least in principle. This is because it is a type of political entity, subject to the raucousness of the agon. Since this state is the one in which we find ourselves, the one through which we may be able to act in the world to realize moral ends, if it is a free republic, I ought to have some respect for it, even if I might not respect those in government or if I believe that freedom is arbitrarily constrained. Since nothing human made in this world is perfect, this respect could well express itself in a want to help to make the state better so that its institutions are better able to translate our moral ideas into practical reality, or at least provide the forum through which competing moral visions may be worked through as peacefully as possible. This is the basis for Kant's (1991) endorsement of republican states in *Perpetual Peace*, and Habermas's (2001) formulation of constitutional patriotism in "Constitutional Democracy." But weariness of the incompleteness or impossibility of the project that Honig points to is an important corrective to help avoid overconfidence. This is especially true in

contexts in which global capital at the same time insulates the state from public accountability and makes it vulnerable to capital's corrosive, anti-political manipulations. A cosmopolitan patriot should work to make her state better, and this is a duty in the Kantian sense when the state is a free republic in which citizens are at least nominally free to participate. In our current, globalized context, making a particular state better includes fortifying not only the political arrangements that increase freedom and responsibility, but also the protection of the state from the ravages of global capital.⁸ The local challenges are also formidable. For it may be true in principle or *de jure* that all citizens may participate, but it might not be possible in a real, *de facto* sense. The political focus for the cosmopolitan, therefore, must first and foremost be the particular state in which she finds herself, rather than some general theoretical state. The proximity of people and institutions, while morally arbitrary, are politically significant. Consequently, the political strategy that a cosmopolitan uses may vary from state to state. The cosmopolitan is constrained by the practical, that is to say, legal limitations of the particular state in which she finds herself.

The state is, in principal, a political entity first and foremost, even though it may be intertwined with, some would say compromised by, economic factors. Cosmopolitan patriotism's central contention is the conscious focusing and foregrounding of the dual allegiance and duties to fellow citizens and the allegiance and duties to fellow human beings that must be negotiated in and through institutions of which the state is ultimately the most politically significant. There is no specific outcome claimed here in the recommendation of this refocusing. Rather, the purpose of recognizing and emphasizing these multiple allegiances is to move the conversation away from us *versus* them conceptions of nationalist patriotism and more toward an us *and* them conception of cosmopolitan patriotism. There is still recognition of the distinction between groups that this recommendation does not try to erase. Rather, it is an inclusive distinction.

How can this refocusing and inclusive distinction be accomplished? Any normative political strategy that seeks to reframe ingrained practices that shape the way large institutions operate is unlikely to be effective if nothing else because of what can be called social path dependency. The most we can hope for is that we might be able to affect the outlook of succeeding generations. And if education is one of the main crucibles that forms human beings and citizens, then it is there that we must look. Other institutions such as religious organizations and corporate entities are private structures that, in liberal societies, are walled

off from state interference. But it is in public schools among the many public institutions that are key. There certainly are already programs in place that attempt to broaden students' perspectives. These include programs providing access to study abroad opportunities, common readership, guest speakerships, and so on. No matter how much students are exposed through such programs there still remain a sizable contingent who, although they might express vague concerns about human beings in general (partly because they are told it is the right thing to do), could not care less about the specificities of that humanity. It is probably the case that those students who do learn from and express interest in the specifics already have the predisposition to do so and would seek it out anyway or are open to it in their lives. It is those many students who do not who are key.

Education is often highly politicized precisely because those in disagreement over what to teach know full well that one of the major aspects at stake is nothing other than the socialization of the future community. So, a focus on education and succeeding generations is subject to similar although not the same political limitations as changing the establishment outlook and its role in shaping policies toward interstate relations. Even so, there have been many successes with education initiatives such as changes in attitudes toward smoking and driving while under the influence. To be sure, these are broad-based initiatives that are not limited to or necessarily originate in schools. Moreover, they do not necessarily require changing curricula or

altering the way we teach. Still, an "interdependence" component for education curricula at all levels could be incorporated into all types of subjects. Admittedly this relies heavily on instructors already disposed to a global perspective, but arguably, this is precisely what the contestation over diversity and multicultural institutions produced. It is undoubtedly the case that this process is long-term that must be negotiated through public discourse.

The stakes are high. The intended outcome is that kind of citizen that is aware of her civic obligations to her fellow citizens and her human obligations to actual people in the world. This is a citizenship formed as a political and social being who can resist the corporatized subjectivity that clouds humane judgment. Such a citizen would thus be able to demand of her state that it be accountable to her, not to corporations. Although we currently live fully under the mode of the corporatized state, it is not too late to reverse the trend. But it will require a herculean effort and innovative approaches to achieve this new kind of citizen who is better able to negotiate the demands of global and local membership in human communities. And this development will allow her to demand the same of the state in which she lives.

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Notes

1. Some even criticize it, arguing that if it exists everywhere, then it effectively exists and can exist nowhere. (See Nagel, 1986)
2. Many Cynics and some other schools repudiated the tie to the city entirely. Considering the variety of schools during the Hellenistic period and their cross-pollination, it is undoubtedly the case that some Stoics also shared this deprecating view of the city.
3. They affect the message not only in terms of what gets said but also in terms of who gets to say it and who gets to be in communicative zones.
4. A simple example in the United States might suffice. If we consider the fictions of manifest destiny, of the role of the European in civilizing the vast “untapped” wasteland of the west, we can see how powerful these ideas can be.
5. The demonstrations in Western countries from Greece to the United States over the last decade that registered this social and political discontent are only the most recent eruptions of a set of rejections of the status quo. From the French suburban riots to the anti-globalization protests before them, although all representing different perspectives, still can be marked as being on the opposite side of the political spectrum than the Tea Party in the United States and similar groups elsewhere. Nonetheless, the discontent with the state on all sides is something real. It is the diagnosis of the problem and the solutions that are different.
6. In the United States, the marginalization of the irrational Right by other, mainstream conservatives had been until recently an effective stopgap and such populist rage.
7. By “state” I of course mean all levels of the institutionalized political sphere. This may include municipal agencies and national ones as well. In the small number of existing federal systems, this means the federal and local levels.

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